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GAT, SOLVAY, AND THE CENTRALIZATION OF PATENT 
LITIGATION IN EUROPE 
Marketa Trimble* 
INTRODUCTION 
As business has become global, so have disputes about patents, patent 
infringement, and patent validity. In many ongoing disputes between patent 
holders and alleged infringers, parties are engaging in parallel court 
proceedings in multiple countries to litigate infringements of parallel patents1 
and to contest the validity of patents. Concentrating litigation involving 
identical inventions and identical or similar conduct into one national or 
multinational court could result in faster, more efficient, and more consistent 
enforcement of patents.2 There are a number of obstacles to any centralization 
of litigation. As the debate about a unified patent litigation system in Europe 
has shown,3 even countries that are geographically, economically, culturally, 
and historically proximate face substantial challenges when attempting to 
adopt a single centralized patent litigation mechanism, even if they link the 
introduction of the mechanism to the creation of a unitary patent.4 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. This 
Recent Development was preceded by the author’s blog post, titled Solvay v. Honeywell and an Alternative 
Route to a Central Patent Court in Europe. See Marketa Trimble, Solvay v. Honeywell and an Alternative 
Route to a Central Patent Court in Europe, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 3, 2012 3:00 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/ 
patent/2012/09/solvay-v-honeywell-and-an-alternative-route-to-a-central-patent-court-in-europe.html. 
 1 Parallel patents are patents granted for the same invention in different countries. 
 2 For a discussion of the potential advantages of centralized patent litigation, see MARKETA TRIMBLE, 
GLOBAL PATENTS: LIMITS OF TRANSNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT 44–59, 64–72 (2012). For discussions of costs 
of multiple parallel litigation, see Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council—Enhancing the Patent System in Europe, at 7–8, COM (2007) 165 final (Apr. 4, 2007), and Dietmar 
Harhoff, Economic Cost-Benefit Analysis of a Unified and Integrated European Patent Litigation System, at 
14–18 (Feb. 26, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/patent/studies/litigation_ 
system_en.pdf. 
 3 See, e.g., Press Release No. 17/11, Court of Justice of the European Union, The Draft Agreement on 
the Creation of a European and Community Patent Court Is Not Compatible with European Union Law (Mar. 
8, 2011), available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2011-03/cp110017en.pdf; 
Conclusions, Part I.3, EUCO 76/12 (June 29, 2012). For a recent analysis of the EU proposals, see Thomas 
Jaeger, All Back to Square One?–An Assessment of the Latest Proposals for a Patent and Court for the 
Internal Market and Possible Alternatives, 43 IIC: INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 286 (2012) 
(Ger.). 
 4 Cf. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Implementing Enhanced 
Cooperation in the Area of the Creation of Unitary Patent Protection, at 2–3, COM (2011) 215 final (Apr. 13, 
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In Europe, where the establishment of a patent litigation mechanism has 
been linked to the creation of a unitary patent, a path to a Unified Patent Court 
has now been paved.5 However, it will take more time before the court system 
and the unified litigation mechanism become operational. Even when the court 
system and the litigation mechanism are operational, they will not address the 
problems of all patent owners fighting infringements of multiple national 
parallel patents because the mechanism has been designed to deal only with 
new unitary patents or European patents under the European Patent 
Convention.6 
The idea of a unified patent litigation system in Europe, which traces its 
origins to at least the 1970s,7 received an important stimulus in 2006 when the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities (“CJEU”)8 rendered its 
judgment in Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnik mbH & Co. KG v. Lamellen und 
Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs KG (“GAT”).9 GAT, by its interpretation of the 
exclusive jurisdiction provision of the European Union (“EU”) legislation on 
jurisdiction of courts in EU member countries, appeared to foreclose the 
possibility of centralizing the litigation of infringements of patents of multiple 
countries into one national court.10 According to the CJEU in GAT, a single 
national court, at least theoretically, can decide on the infringement of multiple 
national patents.11 In practice, however, it is unlikely that national courts will 
be able to make such decisions because, based on GAT, whenever a defendant 
 
2011). The Regulation was adopted in 2012. See Regulation (EU) No. 1257/2012 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 17 December 2012 Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of the Creation of 
Unitary Patent Protection, 2012 O.J. (L361) 1 (EC). The validity of the Regulation has been challenged 
indirectly in actions brought by Italy and Spain. See Joined Cases C-274/11 & C-295/11, Spain v. Council of 
the European Union, Dec. 11, 2012, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text= 
&docid=131666&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=543756. 
 5 Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, Council of the European Union, opened for signature Feb. 19, 
2013, 16351/12, available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st16/st16351.en12.pdf.  
 6 The proposed Unified Patent Court will only adjudicate cases concerning European patents (under the 
Convention on the Grant of European Patents of 5 October 1973, commonly known as the European Patent 
Convention), “European patents with unitary effect” (under Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012, supra note 4), and 
supplementary protection certificates (under EU legislation). Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, supra note 
5, arts. 32 & 2(d)–(h). 
 7 See TRIMBLE, supra note 2, at 27. 
 8 The acronym “CJEU” now refers to the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
 9 Case C-4/03, 2006 E.C.R. I-6523. 
 10 See id. paras. 25–31. 
 11 See id. para. 16 (“If, on the other hand, the dispute does not concern the validity of the patent or the 
existence of the deposit or registration and these matters are not disputed by the parties, the dispute will not be 
covered by Article 16(4) of the [Brussels] Convention . . . . Such would be the case, for example, with an 
infringement action, in which the question of the validity of the patent allegedly infringed is not called into 
question.”). 
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raises the issue of the validity of a foreign patent, a national court must 
dismiss, or at a minimum stay, the proceedings as they relate to the 
infringement of the foreign patent.12 
The grim outlook that the supporters of centralized patent litigation in 
Europe have faced since GAT13—an outlook that so far has not been improved 
by the conclusion of the proposed Agreement on a Unified Patent Court14—
might be replaced by a renewed hope that a national court or a small number of 
national courts in Europe could naturally emerge as a central court or courts for 
patent litigation. This glimmer of hope comes from another recent CJEU 
judgment, Solvay SA v. Honeywell Fluorine Products Europe BV (“Solvay”).15 
That case offers a new interpretation of the effects of the exclusive jurisdiction 
provision—an interpretation that might be flexible enough to permit at least 
some national courts to decide patent infringement cases that concern patents 
granted outside of their country, even when defendants in those cases raise the 
issue of patent validity. 
This Recent Development analyzes whether Solvay can be extended to 
cover preliminary assessments made by German courts in patent infringement 
proceedings when the assessments concern the validity of the patents in 
question. Part I discusses the impact that the GAT decision has had on the 
centralization of patent litigation in Europe. Part II then analyzes the portion of 
the Solvay decision that pertains to the question of applying exclusive 
jurisdiction in proceedings on provisional measures. Based on the analysis in 
Part II, Parts III and IV explore whether the reasoning in Solvay can be 
extended to cover other preliminary decisions concerning the validity of 
foreign patents, and if so, whether such an extension would be compatible with 
GAT. 
 
 12 See id. para. 31. For a debate about the impact of GAT on infringement proceedings and whether courts 
may stay or will have to dismiss the proceedings when the validity of a foreign patent is raised, see JAMES J. 
FAWCETT & PAUL TORREMANS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 360–65 (2d ed. 
2011). 
 13 For some of the commentaries on the impact of GAT, see TRIMBLE, supra note 2, at 57. See also 
Toshiyuki Kono & Paulius Jur ys, General Report, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 41–42 (Toshiyuki Kono ed., 2012). 
 14 See supra notes 5–6. 
 15 C-616/10, July 12, 2012, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text= 
&docid=124996&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=898044. 
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I. THE IMPACT OF GAT 
GAT solidified the notion of exclusive jurisdiction over decisions on the 
validity of patents—the notion that only the courts and administrative bodies of 
the country in which a patent was granted may decide the validity of the 
patent.16 The notion is not surprising; in the United States the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit reached the same conclusion in Voda v. Cordis Corp.17 
Although Voda concerned only the possibility—or rather the impossibility—of 
extending supplementary jurisdiction over foreign patents, the arguments in 
Voda suggest that the Court of Appeals would reject the idea of U.S. courts 
deciding the validity of foreign patents regardless of the jurisdictional ground 
on which the foreign patent was brought into a U.S. court.18 
In the EU, Article 16.4 of the 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction 
and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
(“Brussels Convention”), replaced in March 2002 by Article 22.4 of the 
Brussels I Regulation, vests exclusive jurisdiction over matters of patent 
validity in the courts of the EU member state where a patent was granted.19 
Such courts have exclusive jurisdiction “in proceedings concerned with the 
registration or validity of patents.”20 In GAT, the CJEU faced the question of 
 
 16 See Case C-4/03, 2006 E.C.R. para. 22. 
 17 Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 902 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (stating that “a patent right to exclude only 
arises from the legal right granted and recognized by the sovereign within whose territory the right is 
located”). Recently, the U.K. Supreme Court expressed the same opinion on the justiciability of the validity of 
foreign-registered intellectual property rights in Lucasfilm Limited v. Ainsworth. [2011] UKSC 39. 
 18 See, e.g., Voda, 476 F.3d at 902 (“It would be incongruent to allow the sovereign power of one to be 
infringed or limited by another sovereign’s extension of its jurisdiction.”). 
 19 Convention concernant la competence judiciaire à l’execution des decisions en matière civile et 
commerciale [Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters], art. 16.4, 1968 J.O. (L 299) 32, 35 (EC) [hereinafter Brussels Convention]; Council Regulation 
44/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1, 8 (EC), art. 22.4 [hereinafter Brussels I Regulation]. This Recent Development 
uses the numbering of the Brussels I Regulation even when it refers to decisions that concerned its 
predecessor, the Brussels Convention. The Brussels I Regulation will be replaced as of January 10, 2015, by 
Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (recast), 
2012 O.J. (L351) 1 (EC) [hereinafter Brussels I Regulation (recast)]. 
 20 Brussels I Regulation, supra note 19, art. 22.4 (“The following courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction, 
regardless of domicile: . . . in proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of patents, trade marks, 
designs, or other similar rights required to be deposited or registered, the courts of the Member State in which 
the deposit or registration has been applied for, has taken place or is under the terms of a Community 
instrument or an international convention deemed to have taken place.”). For a discussion of one difference in 
the various language versions of the Brussels I Regulation, see Case C-4/03, Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnik 
mbH & Co. KG v. Lamellen und Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs KG, Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, 
2006 E.C.R. I-6511, para. 33 [hereinafter Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed]. 
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whether the exclusive jurisdiction provision concerned only actions for a 
declaration of invalidity of a patent or whether the provision also applied when 
the issue of patent validity reached the court in a different manner—as a 
counterclaim, or as a defense raised by the defendant in a patent infringement 
suit.21 The CJEU decided that, regardless of the manner in which the issue of 
validity arises in court proceedings, a court may not decide the validity of 
foreign patents.22 
The holding in GAT thereafter impacted the wording of the revised 
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (“Lugano II Convention”), which 
sets the rules of jurisdiction for courts in the European Economic Area.23 The 
revised Lugano II Convention now includes in its exclusive jurisdiction 
provision—which is otherwise a mirror image of Article 22.4 of the Brussels I 
Regulation—an additional clarification that the exclusive jurisdiction applies 
“irrespective of whether the issue [of patent validity] is raised by way of an 
action or as a defence.”24 The same wording has also been inserted in the recast 
of the Brussels I Regulation, which was adopted at the end of 2012 and which 
will apply from January 10, 2015.25 
To fully appreciate GAT and the accompanying judgment in Roche 
Nederland BV v. Frederick Primus (“Roche”)26 it is important to recall that 
both judgments reflected the CJEU’s reaction to undesirable patent litigation 
practices that had spread across Europe. The practices included strategic forum 
shopping and the launching of threatening (and feared) “torpedoes”—the filing 
of declaratory judgment suits in slower jurisdictions in an attempt to inhibit 
parallel infringement suits in the courts of more expeditious jurisdictions.27 
While GAT and Roche were perhaps understandable as attempts to 
 
 21 See Case C-4/03, 2006 E.C.R. para. 13. 
 22 Id. para. 25. 
 23 See Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, June 10, 2009, 2009 O.J. (L 147) 1–44 [hereinafter Lugano II Convention]; STEFAN 
LUGINBÜHL, EUROPEAN PATENT LAW: TOWARDS A UNIFORM INTERPRETATION 50 (2011). 
 24 Lugano II Convention, supra note 23, at 2, 12. See also Fausto Pocar, Explanatory Report on the 
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercials 
Matters, Dec. 23, 2009, O.J. (C 319) 27. The Lugano II Convention became effective on January 1, 2010. 
Summary of Treaty, EUROPA.EU, http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/ 
treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=true&treatyId=7481 (last visited Jan. 30, 2013) (listing the “Date of 
Entry into Force” for the Lugano II Convention). 
 25 Brussels I Regulation (recast), supra note 19, arts. 24(4) & 81. 
 26 Case C-539/03, 2006 E.C.R. I-6569. 
 27 See TRIMBLE, supra note 2, 48–49, 54–57 (including a discussion of “torpedoes”). 
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circumscribe national court jurisdiction in patent matters, the decisions were 
criticized for failing to eliminate the possibility of undesirable litigation 
practices, and for preventing any effective concentration of the litigation of 
multiple national parallel patents in one court.28 
Disappointed by the CJEU’s curtailing of the jurisdictional flexibility that 
would have permitted a centralization of patent litigation, experts working at 
the intersection of intellectual property and conflict of laws (private 
international law) proposed several solutions to the centralization problem. 
These projects, such as those spearheaded by the American Law Institute and 
the Max Planck Institute Group on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property, 
scrutinized the existing judgments, evaluated the chances that the decisions 
could be overruled or their effects changed legislatively, and offered solutions 
to the centralization of patent litigation based on their perceptions of the 
chances for changing the results of the judgments.29 Several experts also 
authored studies about the problems associated with exclusive jurisdiction in 
intellectual property cases.30 Recently, Professor Benedetta Ubertazzi devoted 
an entire monograph to the problems associated with exclusive jurisdiction, 
concluding that:  
[E]xclusive jurisdiction rules related to [intellectual property rights] 
cases are not only insufficiently supported by any of the arguments 
usually invoked in their favor, but actually are also contrary to the 
public international rules on the avoidance of a denial of justice and 
on the fundamental human right of access to a court.31 
In addition to searching for a proper balance between exclusive jurisdiction 
and jurisdictional flexibility, the experts also attempted to fill in gaps that 
existing judgments on the matter left open. Indeed, GAT itself left several 
 
 28 Id. 
 29 See, e.g., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW, AND 
JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES (Am. Law Inst., West, Westlaw, 2008); PRINCIPLES ON CONFLICT 
OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (European Max Planck Grp. on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Prop. 
2011), http://www.cl-ip.eu/files/pdf2/Final_Text_1_December_2011.pdf; Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C. 
Ginsburg, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters, 77 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1065 (2002); Transparency Proposal on Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Intellectual Property, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE GLOBAL 
ARENA 394 (Jürgen Basedow et al. eds., 2010); Korean Private International Law Association, Principles on 
International Intellectual Property Litigation (Mar. 26, 2010) (on file with author); see also TRIMBLE, supra 
note 2, at 59–64.  
 30 E.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing a Private International Intellectual Property Law: The 
Demise of Territoriality?, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711, 788–91 (2009). 
 31 BENEDETTA UBERTAZZI, EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 295 (2012). 
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questions unanswered. The CJEU did not specify how national courts should 
proceed when invalidity is counterclaimed or raised as a defense. Courts could 
stay infringement proceedings and wait for the courts or patent offices of the 
various countries that granted the patents to decide patent validity, or courts 
could dismiss infringement cases altogether and refer parties to the courts of 
the countries where the patents were granted.32 Another unanswered question 
concerned court approaches to cases involving the validity of patents granted 
in countries outside the EU.33 As commentators have observed, it remains an 
open question whether a national law on jurisdiction should determine which 
country’s courts have jurisdiction to decide the validity of patents—even if 
jurisdiction over a defendant is based on one of the provisions of the Brussels I 
Regulation—or whether the exclusive jurisdiction provision of the Brussels I 
Regulation should be interpreted as encompassing foreign patents 
notwithstanding the clear language of Article 22.4, which refers to patents 
granted in or for the EU member states.34 
II. THE JUDGMENT IN SOLVAY 
One of the questions that GAT left unanswered concerned the potential 
effect of Article 22.4 on the jurisdiction of courts in granting provisional 
measures under Article 31 of the Brussels I Regulation. Article 31 contains a 
special jurisdictional rule for provisional measures, allowing parties to apply 
for provisional measures in a court in any EU member state, “even if, under 
[the Brussels I] Regulation, the courts of another Member State have 
jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter.”35 GAT did not address the 
question of whether jurisdiction for provisional measures exists even where a 
case concerns a patent, patent validity is raised, and the court that is asked to 
grant provisional measures is not a court of the country where the patent was 
granted. In July 2012, the CJEU answered this question in Solvay in response 
to a reference for a preliminary ruling submitted by a Dutch court. The CJEU 
ruled that the preliminary assessment of validity that the Dutch court must 
 
 32 See FAWCETT & TORREMANS, supra note 12, at 360–65 (discussing the approach to this problem taken 
by courts before GAT); see also TRIMBLE, supra note 2, at 51–52.  
 33 TRIMBLE, supra note 2, at 46–47. 
 34 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 19, art. 22.4; Brussels I Regulation (recast), supra note 19, art. 
24(4); see also Marko Schauwecker, Die Entscheidung GAT gegen LuK und drittstaatliche Patente, 2009 
GRUR INT. 187. 
 35 Brussels I Regulation, supra note 19, art. 31 (“Application may be made to the courts of a Member 
State for such provisional, including protective, measures as may be available under the law of that State, even 
if, under this Regulation, the courts of another Member State have jurisdiction as to the substance of the 
matter.”); see also Brussels I Regulation (recast), supra note 19, art. 35. 
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make in interim proceedings before deciding whether or not to grant a 
preliminary measure does fall within the provisional measure jurisdiction of 
Article 31, and that therefore the Dutch court may make an assessment of 
patent validity—even if the assessment concerns a foreign patent.36 
The CJEU put forth two arguments to support the portion of its judgment in 
Solvay that pertain to the effects of the exclusive jurisdiction provision of 
Article 22.4.37 The first argument relies on the texts and objectives of Articles 
22.4 and 31 and their positions in the structure of the Brussels I Regulation.38 
While Article 22.4 qualifies any jurisdictional ground in the Regulation, it does 
not limit the jurisdiction that a court may exercise under Article 31, which 
“regulate[s] different situations.”39 Because the jurisdiction to issue provisional 
measures under Article 31 is without limits, any court may issue provisional 
measures, even if it is a court in a country other than the country of the patent 
grant.40 The position of Article 31 in the scheme of the Brussels I Regulation 
supports the interpretation that Article 31 should be read independently from 
the preceding jurisdictional provisions: Article 31 is in a separate section from 
the other jurisdictional provisions and appears after the exclusive jurisdiction 
provision of Article 22.4 (Article 31 is in Section 10 of Chapter II of the 
Regulation, while the other jurisdictional grounds are in Sections 1–7 of the 
same chapter).41 
The second CJEU argument concerns the problem of the application of 
Article 25 of the Brussels I Regulation, which requires that a court reject the 
exercise of jurisdiction over a claim that “is principally concerned with a 
matter over which the courts of another Member State have exclusive 
jurisdiction” under Article 22.42 The CJEU had to explain whether Article 25 
 
 36 See Case C-616/10, supra note 15, paras. 31–51. 
 37  Id. Another portion of the judgment concerns the interpretation of Article 6.1 of the Brussels I 
Regulation. Id. paras. 17–30. 
 38 Id. paras. 36–40. 
 39 Id. para. 36. 
 40 Id. paras. 36–37. 
 41 Id. paras. 38–40. The position of the corresponding article is the same in the Brussels I Regulation 
(recast). See Brussels I Regulation (recast), supra note 19, art. 35 (placing the corresponding article in Section 
10 of the document). 
 42 Brussels I Regulation, supra note 19, art. 25 (“Where a court of a Member State is seised of a claim 
which is principally concerned with a matter over which the courts of another Member State have exclusive 
jurisdiction by virtue of Article 22, it shall declare of its own motion that it has no jurisdiction.”); Case C-
616/10, supra note 15, para. 10. For a discussion of the difference among the various language versions, see 
Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, supra note 20, para. 34. See Brussels I Regulation (recast), supra note 
19, art. 27. 
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mandated dismissal in proceedings on provisional measures under Article 31.43 
Although the CJEU could have easily referred to the same arguments 
concerning the language and the scheme of the Regulation, the Court instead 
argued that the particular nature of the decision on foreign patent validity that 
was at issue in the Dutch proceeding did not trigger the application of Article 
25.44 
Arguments against the application of Article 25 in proceedings on 
provisional measures in which jurisdiction is based on Article 31 would have 
been straightforward for the CJEU to construct. As the Court did when it 
analyzed the applicability of Article 22.4, when discussing the applicability of 
Article 25 the Court could have pointed to the clear language of Article 31, 
which expressly grants jurisdiction for provisional measures without regard to 
other jurisdictional grounds in the Regulation.45 If Article 31 does not yield to 
Article 22.4 because of the unequivocal language of Article 31, then Article 31 
should also not yield to Article 25. Similarly, looking at the structure of the 
Brussels I Regulation, there appears to be no difference between the 
relationships of Article 22.4 to 31 and Article 25 to 31; in both instances the 
provisions appear in separate sections of Chapter II of the Regulation and in 
both instances Article 31 follows the other two provisions, with the order 
suggesting that Article 31 takes precedence over the earlier provisions.46 
Perhaps an argument could have also been made that an application for a 
provisional measure is not “a claim which is principally concerned with a 
matter over which the courts of another Member State have exclusive 
jurisdiction,”47 meaning that the application for a provisional measure does not 
present the kind of claim for which a dismissal is mandated by Article 25. 
The CJEU could have relied on textual and structural arguments similar to 
those that served the Court well when it explained the relationship between 
Articles 22.4 and 31. And yet in arguing that in the case of the Dutch interim 
proceedings “the specific binding effect” 48 of Article 22.4 did not trigger the 
application of Article 25, the CJEU abandoned textual and structural 
arguments and instead focused on the nature of the particular decision on 
patent validity that was at issue in Solvay. The CJEU explained that in the 
 
 43 See Case C-616/10, supra note 15, paras. 41–51. 
 44 Id. 
 45 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 19, art. 31. 
 46 See id. arts. 22.4, 25, 31. 
 47 Id. art. 31 (emphasis added). 
 48 Case C-616/10, supra note 15, para. 47. 
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interim proceedings at issue, the Dutch court makes only “an assessment as to 
how the court [in the country of the patent grant] would rule” on patent 
validity,49 and that such an assessment “will not in any way prejudice [any 
potential] decision to be taken on the substance by [a] court”50 in the country 
of the patent grant. The particular nature of the Dutch court’s assessment of 
patent validity means that even if a court in the foreign country where the 
patent was granted later decides “on the substance,” the earlier Dutch interim 
decision and the later foreign decision would not be inconsistent.51 The 
provisional nature of the Dutch decision means that the decision is not a final 
conclusion on validity; a final conclusion can later be made by a court or 
patent office in the country of the patent grant.52 Because there is no risk of 
conflicting decisions by courts in various EU member states, which is a risk 
that the Brussels Convention “seeks specifically to avoid”53 and that Article 22 
addresses,54 there is no requirement that Article 25 be applied and that Article 
31 be “disapplied”55 in “a case such as that in the main proceedings.”56 
III.  IMPACT OF SOLVAY ON OTHER PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENTS OF PATENT 
VALIDITY 
The three paragraphs that the CJEU devoted to analyzing the effect that the 
nature of the Dutch court’s decision on patent validity had on the application—
or rather non-application—of Article 2557 raise the question of whether other 
preliminary decisions on the validity of foreign patents could also be affected 
by the CJEU’s reasoning in Solvay. For instance, if Solvay could be extended 
to cover preliminary assessments of patent validity made by German courts in 
patent infringement proceedings, the extension could open the possibility that 
German courts could adjudicate foreign patent infringements without having to 
stay or dismiss cases each time a defendant raises the issue of the validity of a 
foreign patent. 
 
 49 Id. para. 48. 
 50 Id. para. 50. 
 51 See id. 
 52 See id. 
 53 Id. para. 46. 
 54 See id. para. 47 (referring to the predecessor of Article 22.4, which was Article 16.4 of the Brussels 
Convention). 
 55 Id. para. 50. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. paras. 48–50. 
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The possibility of centralization of proceedings would permit natural 
centers of patent litigation to emerge and serve litigants who fight 
infringements of multiple national parallel patents.58 If German courts had 
jurisdiction over a defendant, a plaintiff could bring a patent infringement 
action against that defendant concerning patents granted in multiple countries 
without the danger that the defendant’s counterclaim or defense of foreign 
patent invalidity would cause the case to be stayed or dismissed. Although the 
resulting centralization of patent litigation would have one major limitation 
(German courts would still have to be able to assert personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant), the centralization would be an undeniable improvement over 
the fragmented patent litigation situation that currently exists in the EU. 
German patent infringement court assessments of patent validity are similar 
to the assessments in the Dutch interim proceeding that was at issue in Solvay. 
In the German bifurcated system, final decisions concerning patent validity and 
patent infringement are made separately by different bodies and courts; the 
issues may eventually meet before the German Federal Supreme Court if both 
issues proceed to that point.59 Notwithstanding the separation of functions, 
infringement courts often must address the issue of patent validity. When the 
issue is raised in an infringement proceeding, the infringement court follows 
the rule of civil procedure that allows a court to stay a proceeding if the court’s 
decision depends “wholly or in part on the question of whether a legal 
relationship does or does not exist.”60 The infringement court typically assesses 
whether there is a likelihood that a claim of invalidity of a patent would be 
successful before the Patent Office and the Federal Patent Court, who decide 
on the validity of German patents.61 If the infringement court finds it likely that 
an invalidity claim will succeed, the court may stay the infringement 
proceedings, but is not required to do so.62 According to at least one 
commentator, “German infringement courts quite rarely stay the infringement 
case,” and “[a] stay of patent infringement proceedings is normally only 
granted if the invalidation action/opposition is very likely successful.”63 While 
 
 58 See supra note 6. 
 59 For a discussion of German proceedings, see TRIMBLE, supra note 2, at 69–72. 
 60 Id. at 69; ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], Dec. 5, 2005, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL.] §148 (Ger.), translated in Code of Civil Procedure, BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER 
JUSTIZ, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_zpo/englisch_zpo.html#p0581 (last visited Jan. 30, 2013). 
 61 TRIMBLE, supra note 2, at 69. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Peter Mes, Reflections on the German Patent Litigation System, in PATENTS AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
PROGRESS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 401, 406 (Wolrad Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont et al. eds., 2009). 
TRIMBLE GALLEYSFINAL 4/3/2013 9:59 AM 
526 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26 
German courts continue to make preliminary assessments with regard to 
German patents, after GAT the courts cannot make assessments with regard to 
patents granted in other countries, and certainly not those granted in other EU 
countries.64 
There are a number of similarities between Dutch court preliminary 
decisions and German preliminary assessments concerning patent validity. As 
with the Dutch court decisions on patent validity in the interim proceedings at 
issue in Solvay, German infringement court assessments concerning patent 
validity do not resolve the issue of patent validity with finality.65 Neither the 
Dutch nor the German preliminary decisions cause national patent offices to 
cancel any patents at issue, and neither the Dutch nor the German decisions 
foreclose any final decisions on patent validity by competent bodies or 
courts.66 The decisions in both cases are binding only inter partes—binding 
only on the parties in the interim proceedings and the infringement litigation—
and are only temporary until a final decision on validity is made by a 
component body or court.67 If the interim proceedings result in the grant of 
provisional measures and the infringement proceedings in the award of 
remedies, and later a final decision on patent validity reveals that the earlier 
decisions were based on an incorrect assessment of patent validity, the injured 
party can seek to remedy the situation and obtain redress.68 
Certainly, limitations as to the parties affected and as to the duration of the 
effects of preliminary decisions and assessments concerning validity are often 
illusory; the effect of a preliminary assessment concerning patent validity may 
extend well beyond the immediate proceedings and impact third parties and 
their conduct. Similarly, it could be argued that the temporary effects of a 
preliminary assessment may extend for a significant period of time if validity 
proceedings are lengthy, or the effects may continue indefinitely if the parties 
do not pursue the validity issue in separate validity proceedings and instead 
allow the preliminary assessment to govern the validity issue between them 
permanently. 
A difference between Dutch interim proceedings and German infringement 
proceedings that is important for the purposes of Solvay is the different 
 
 64 For discussion regarding the debate about the applicability of the Brussels I Regulation on patents 
granted in countries outside the EU, see supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
 65 Compare text accompanying notes 59–64, with text accompanying notes 49–52. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
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jurisdictional grounds on which Dutch and German courts rely in the 
proceedings. While Dutch courts base their jurisdiction for interim proceedings 
on the special provision of Article 31 of the Brussels I Regulation for 
proceedings concerning provisional measures,69 German infringement courts 
base their jurisdiction on either general jurisdiction (Article 2) or one of the 
special jurisdictional grounds (such as Article 5.3 or 6.1).70 If exclusive 
jurisdiction under Article 22.4 supersedes general and special jurisdictional 
grounds but does not affect jurisdiction under Article 31, the different result is 
inevitable: German infringement courts are bound by Article 22.4, while Dutch 
courts are not. 
However, the difference in the Dutch and German courts’ jurisdictional 
grounds might be irrelevant if Article 25 is declared moot in cases in which 
there is no danger that decisions resulting from the proceedings “will . . . in 
any way prejudice the decision to be taken on the substance by the court 
having jurisdiction under Article 22(4).”71 As long as “the decision on the 
substance” refers to a decision on patent validity, that decision can be made by 
a competent court after the provisional decision or assessment of validity, and 
although the final decision might be contrary to the earlier preliminary decision 
or assessment, the final decision will not conflict with the preliminary decision 
or assessment.72 While the final and the preliminary decisions might co-exist 
with respect to their determinations that pertain to the validity of patents, the 
party harmed by an earlier preliminary decision or assessment that is 
inconsistent with a final determination of patent validity may seek redress and 
remedy the inconsistency.73 
There is another difference between Dutch interim proceedings and 
German infringement proceedings that could be important if Article 25 is 
considered moot for both Dutch and German preliminary decisions on patent 
validity that are made in the proceedings. Dutch interim proceedings under 
Article 31, unlike German infringement proceedings, are not likely to result in 
a decision that would require recognition and enforcement in another country. 
The purpose of Article 31 is to allow a plaintiff to seek provisional measures 
where such measures are available, and while the possibility certainly exists 
 
 69 See text accompanying notes 36–40; see also Brussels I Regulation (recast), supra note 19, art. 35. 
 70 Brussels I Regulation, supra note 19, arts. 2, 5.3, 6.1; Brussels I Regulation (recast), supra note 19, 
arts. 4, 7(2), 8(1). 
 71 Case C-616/10, supra note 15, para. 50. 
 72 See text accompanying notes 48–56. 
 73 See id. 
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that the enforcement of the measures issued in the proceedings under Article 
31 could require the assistance of another country’s judicial system, it is 
probably unlikely.74 By contrast, infringement decisions arising from German 
infringement proceedings might have to be enforced, fully or partially, in 
another country and therefore will be subject to scrutiny under that country’s 
rules on recognition and enforcement of judgments.75 
The difference in the possible need for cross-border enforcement in the 
decisions of Dutch and German courts is important because the Brussels I 
Regulation includes two tools to prevent courts from violating the exclusive 
jurisdiction rule of Article 22.4. One tool is the obligation imposed on a court 
in Article 25 to dismiss a case if the courts of another EU member state have 
exclusive jurisdiction under Article 22.76 The second tool is embedded in the 
system of recognition of judgments where, under Article 35.1, a court shall not 
recognize a foreign judgment if it conflicts with the exclusive jurisdiction 
provision of Article 22.77 Even if a German infringement court were to decide 
that Article 25 did not apply to its proceedings and that, therefore, it could 
conduct a preliminary assessment of the validity of a foreign patent based on 
the arguments in Solvay, it is unclear whether the court could rely on the courts 
of other EU countries, particularly the countries whose patents were at issue, to 
respect the German court’s final decision on infringement issued after the 
preliminary assessment of validity. 
The connection between Articles 25 and 35.1, although largely immaterial 
in the context of proceedings on provisional measures, is important in the 
context of infringement proceedings, and this connection calls for a single 
approach throughout the EU on the interpretation of the applicability of the 
exclusive jurisdiction provision of Article 22.4. For the private international 
law system to function, both the infringement court making the preliminary 
assessment of the validity of a foreign patent and any other court in the EU that 
might be asked to recognize an infringement decision by the infringement 
 
 74 See id. 
 75 E.g., UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (2005); see also Legislative 
Fact Sheet—Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http:// 
uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Foreign-Country%20Money%20Judgments%20Recognition 
%20Act (last visited Feb. 6, 2013). 
 76 Brussels I Regulation, supra note 19, art. 25; Brussels I Regulation (recast), supra note 19, art. 27. 
 77 Brussels I Regulation, supra note 19, art. 35.1 (“Moreover, a judgment shall not be recognised if it 
conflicts with Sections 3, 4 or 6 of Chapter II, or in a case provided for in Article 72.”). Article 22 is in Section 
6 of the Brussels I Regulation. See id. art. 22. Brussels I Regulation (recast), supra note 19, art. 45.1(e)(ii). 
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court would have to agree on whether Article 22.4 applies to preliminary 
assessments of patent validity. 
Since the CJEU apparently envisioned in Solvay that provisional measures 
issued in Dutch interim proceedings following a preliminary decision on 
foreign patent validity could be recognized and enforced in other EU countries 
based on the Brussels I Regulation, German court decisions on patent 
infringements made following a preliminary assessment of foreign patent 
validity should receive the same treatment.78 Only if Article 22.4 is held 
inapplicable generally to preliminary assessments of patent validity in interim 
proceedings on provisional measures can Article 25 permit courts to make such 
assessments and Article 35.1 allow other courts to recognize any provisional 
measures that may be issued. And if such a general inapplicability exists, 
Article 22.4 should be inapplicable to German provisional assessments of 
patent validity as well. 
IV.  READING GAT IN LIGHT OF SOLVAY 
Those who might oppose an extension of Solvay’s Article 25 argument to 
preliminary decisions on patent validity, beyond the decisions that are made in 
proceedings on provisional measures, might be concerned that GAT would 
have to be overruled in order for all preliminary decisions on patent validity, 
such as German infringement courts’ assessments of patent validity, to be 
excluded from the exclusive jurisdiction provision of Article 22.4. This 
concern is warranted because GAT involved a German infringement court 
decision and therefore addressed a preliminary assessment of validity of 
foreign patents.79 Nevertheless, a particular reading of GAT in light of Solvay 
suggested below might permit the two decisions to coexist. 
In Solvay, the CJEU focused on one objective of the exclusive jurisdiction 
provision (avoiding the risk of conflicting decisions), while in GAT the Court 
discussed three objectives of Article 22.4. The first objective discussed in GAT 
is the objective to “ensure that jurisdiction rests with courts closely linked to 
the proceedings in fact and law.”80 Undeniably, courts with exclusive 
 
 78 The facts in the Solvay case suggest that enforcement of provisional measures outside the Netherlands 
could indeed be an issue. See Case C-616/10, supra note 15, paras. 12–14. 
 79 Case C-4/03, 2006 E.C.R. para. 10. 
 80 Id. para. 21; see also P. Jenard, Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1979 O.J. (C 59) 1, 22 (discussing the need for a “close 
connecting factor between the dispute and the court with jurisdiction to resolve it”). 
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jurisdiction under Article 22.4 will be the courts “best placed to adjudicate” 
issues of patent validity.81 However, a preliminary assessment of the likelihood 
that a validity claim will be successful is not an adjudication of patent validity 
and arguably does not “establish, indirectly, the invalidity of the patent at 
issue.”82 Decisions on patent validity, and certainly final decisions on patent 
validity, continue to be made by competent bodies of the countries where 
patents were granted or by courts in those countries under Article 22.4. 
The second objective of the exclusive jurisdiction provision that the CJEU 
discussed in GAT is the objective of limiting “the heads of jurisdiction” and 
promotion of “the predictability of the rules of jurisdiction” and “the principle 
of legal certainty.”83 Allowing preliminary assessments in German 
infringement courts to proceed does not seem to be contrary to these 
objectives. There will be only one “head of jurisdiction” for decisions on 
patent validity—exclusive jurisdiction based on Article 22.4. Rules of 
jurisdiction will not be less predictable, and the patent owner and the alleged 
infringer may still expect to litigate infringement in the courts of the countries 
where jurisdiction lies based on Articles 2, 5.3, and 6.1,84 and to seek final 
decisions on patent validity in courts with exclusive jurisdiction under Article 
22.4.85 Predictability will be increased for plaintiffs in infringement actions; 
they will be able to select a forum within the jurisdictional constraints of the 
Brussels I Regulation and will not have their cases stayed or dismissed because 
defendants counterclaim invalidity of a foreign patent or raise invalidity as a 
defense.86 Legal certainty will not suffer more than when the infringements of 
a country’s own patents are litigated; problems with post-infringement findings 
of patent validity are foreign to neither bifurcated nor non-bifurcated systems. 
The third objective discussed in GAT by the CJEU was the desire to avoid 
conflicting decisions.87 The Court did not note the limited effect of German 
infringement court decisions on patent validity in terms of their temporary 
 
 81 Case C-4/03, 2006 E.C.R. para. 22 (emphasis added); see also Case C-288/82, Duijnstee v. 
Goderbauer, 1983 E.C.R. 3664, 3668 (CJEU) (“In order to maintain the link between the substantive law 
applicable and its procedural implementation, preference must . . . be given to the . . . place in which the courts 
are to have exclusive jurisdiction.”). 
 82 Case C-4/03, 2006 E.C.R. para. 26 (emphasis added). 
 83 Id. para. 28. 
 84 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 19, arts. 2, 5.3, 6.1. 
 85 See id. art. 22.4. 
 86 See Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, supra note 20, para. 23 (“If the claimant in a private 
action can easily determine the court to which he can apply and if the defendant can easily determine in which 
court he can be sued, then the interests of both legal protection and legal certainty will be served.”). 
 87 See C-4/03, 2006 E.C.R. para. 29. 
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nature, but focused only on the limited effect on the parties bound by the 
decisions, and pointed out that while under German law the effects of a 
decision are limited to the parties to the infringement proceedings, court 
decisions on patent validity in other countries have erga omnes effects.88 The 
CJEU rejected the argument that inter partes and erga omnes decisions could 
be treated differently, and explained that a different treatment of the decisions 
“would . . . lead to distortions, thereby undermining the equality and 
uniformity of rights and obligations arising under the [Brussels I Regulation] 
for the [member states] and the persons concerned.”89 If the right of a plaintiff 
in a patent infringement action consists of a limited choice between several 
possible fora (such as under Articles 2, 5.3 and 6.1),90 and if a member state’s 
obligation is to assure that only courts in the country where a patent was 
granted decide patent validity, then the German infringement court’s 
preliminary assessment of validity of a foreign patent fosters the right while 
not breaching the obligation. 
At least two criticisms can be made of any attempt to read GAT as allowing 
preliminary assessments of validity of foreign patents in infringement 
proceedings. First, it can be argued that a plausible reading of GAT is merely 
semantic, replacing the word “decision” with the word “assessment.” Second, 
regardless of how GAT is interpreted today, it is undeniable that the CJEU 
considered in GAT precisely the preliminary assessments of patent validity that 
are at issue in German infringement proceedings, and that the CJEU rejected 
the proposition that the preliminary assessments could be excluded from the 
scope of Article 22.4.91 The Court even rejected the argument that Article 25 
could delineate the scope of jurisdiction under Article 22.4.92 As the Advocate 
General in the case, the late Professor Geelhoed noted in his opinion to GAT 
that “the provisions of Article [25] of the Brussels [I Regulation] were 
thoroughly discussed during the proceedings before the Court and it was made 
clear that Article [25] is not a rule of jurisdiction and that its interpretation 
cannot determine the interpretation of Article [22].”93 
 
 88 See id. para. 30. 
 89 Id.  
 90 Cf. Brussels I Regulation, supra note 19, at 2 (noting in recital 12, that “there should be alternative 
grounds of jurisdiction based on a close link between the court and the action or in order to facilitate the sound 
administration of justice.”). 
 91 See C-4/03, 2006 E.C.R. para. 31. 
 92 Cf. id. para. 28. 
 93 Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, supra note 20, para. 34. 
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CONCLUSION 
Solvay and the considerations of its effects, if any, on other preliminary 
decisions on or assessments of validity of foreign patents, reopen a crucial 
question that needs to be answered so that countries can decide whether 
concentrating patent litigation is feasible, and if so, what form it should take. 
The question pertains to the true reason or reasons why countries oppose or 
hesitate about permitting courts to decide the validity of foreign patents. If the 
primary reason is the act of state doctrine and the desire to respect the 
sovereignty reflected in a country’s grant of a patent, it may be that 
preliminary assessments of the validity of foreign patents, which do not result 
in the cancellation of patents, could be acceptable. If the concern is that courts 
in foreign countries cannot be entrusted with elaborate decisions that combine 
the complexities of patent law and modern technology, perhaps foreign courts 
should not even make preliminary assessments. 
Uncovering the real reason or reasons for countries’ reluctance to permit 
courts to decide the validity of foreign patents should also help in identifying 
acceptable solutions for centralizing patent litigation. If the act of state doctrine 
defines the debate, a multinational court that would arise out of an international 
treaty might be the only viable solution. If a lack of sufficient technical 
expertise worries countries, such worries might be allayed if natural centers of 
patent litigation were allowed to emerge in national courts that deal with large 
patent dockets and therefore have significant expertise in both patent law and a 
wide range of technologies. 
Professor Ubertazzi’s book94 could serve as an excellent guide to 
discussing the true reasons for countries’ hesitations about allowing courts to 
decide the validity of foreign patents; she provides a detailed analysis of the 
various arguments that have been made in support of the exclusive jurisdiction 
rule for intellectual property cases. If her work—and the work of other experts 
who have argued in favor of abolishing or softening the rule of exclusive 
jurisdiction—is successful in changing the opinions of those who believe in the 
necessity of the expansive exclusive jurisdiction rule, then EU law must 
change, either legislatively or through a reconsidered interpretation of the 
Brussels I Regulation. To extend Solvay to German infringement court 
assessments of patent validity, the CJEU would probably need to overrule 
 
 94 UBERTAZZI, supra note 31. 
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GAT, which might be difficult given that the recast of the Brussels I Regulation 
incorporates language importing the holding in GAT. 
If German courts were to have the opportunity to emerge as natural centers 
for litigating the infringements of patents of multiple countries, this 
development could promote the effective enforcement of patents until a unified 
EU patent litigation mechanism becomes operational and afterward a 
centralization in national courts would permit the unified litigation of multiple 
national parallel patents. A discussion of whether and to what extent a 
centralization of patent litigation would be truly beneficial—and to whom—is 
beyond the scope of this article. This article also does not consider what the 
wisdom of centralizing patent litigation in a bifurcated system, as opposed to a 
non-bifurcated system, might be. Clearly, these issues deserve further 
discussion. 
 
